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By L. C. GREEN*
On July 16th, 1974, Judge King-Hamilton sitting in the Central Criminal
Court, London, found Felicia Foluke Adesanya, a Yoruba, guilty of assault-
ing her sons, Roufemi, aged 14, and Lanre, aged 9, occasioning bodily harm,
having cut their faces with a knife. For Mrs. Adesanya it had been pleaded
that the boys had agreed to her actions, which after all only involved tribal
scarification during new year celebrations. The learned judge felt he was able
to take a lenient view of the case and order her absolute discharge, for "this
is a test case, the first of its kind, and. .. I am convinced you did not realize
you were breaking the law."' This case immediately throws into profile a
fundamental issue of anthropological jurisprudence - the conflict and the
interplay as between 'civilized' systems and concepts of law and the
'primitive' people to whom such systems seek to apply.
In order to avoid unnecessary semantic disputation as to the meaning
of words, it is as well that we define how the terms 'civilization' and
'primitive' are being used in this paper. Civilization is a relative term depend-
ing upon the ethos, beliefs, culture and background of the person using it,
and that person's concept of the primitive condition is formed on exactly
the same basis. According to Article 36 of the Statute of the International
Court of Justice, one of the 'sources' of international law consists of general
principles of law recognized by civilized nations2, although the Court has
never found it necessary to decide a case on these alone. This inability is by
no means surprising, for it would be well-nigh impossible to decide what
constituted general principles of law, other than perhaps that unjustifiable
homicide constitutes a punishable offence. Moreover, who is to decide which
are the civilized nations? Every member of the United Nations, which is
automatically also a party to the Statute of the Court, regards itself as
'civilized' and would contend that if it did not recognize any particular legal
principle, that principle could not therefore be a general principle of law for
if it were, it would obviously be recognized by the state in question since
that state is, as the whole world knows, civilized. All that one can say of this
concept is that general principles of law recognized by civilized nations are
nothing but those principles of law which are generally recognized by us
and those nations which we consider to be civilized. For our purposes,
therefore, the term civilization will be used to connote a state which possesses
a sophisticated legal system in the common and civil law traditions. It is
* University Professor, University of Alberta.
1 The Times (London), 16, 17 July 1974.
2 See, e.g., B. Cheng, General Principles of Law as Applied by International Courts
and Tribunals (London: Stevens, 1953); G. Herczegh, General Principles of Law and
the International Legal Order (Budapest: Akademiai Kiado, 1969).
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equally difficult to define 'primitiveness', and we will use the term to connote
a people which is not sophisticated in the above sense, which is regarded as
primitive by the ordinary lay person, and which has found itself in a special
relationship with one of the more sophisticated groups which latter has
attempted to impose, graft or adapt its system of law on to such primitive
society.3
The interplay between a civilized and a primitive people requiring some
examination of the legal framework may arise in one of two ways. On the
one hand, the sophisticated may arrive and take over the territory inhabited
by the primitives, establishing themselves and their own government, making
the territory in question their own country, as happened in such places as
Australia, New Zealand, North America and South Africa. In other places,
the invaders took the territory but did so only as a colony or a protectorate,
establishing their alien order, but not intending to make the land their own
home, for they sent their children 'home' to school and themselves hoped to
'return home to die'. In the former case, there was no hesitation about im-
posing their own system of law, especially when the settlers were English,
for an Englishman took his law with him: "Colonists carry with them only
so much of the English law as is applicable to their own situation and the
condition of an infant colony; such, for instance, as the general rules of
inheritance and of protection from personal injuries. The artificial refine-
ments and distinctions incident to the property of a great and commercial
people, the laws of police and revenue .... the jurisdiction of spiritual courts,
and a multitude of other provisions, are neither necessary nor convenient for
them, and therefore not in force. What shall be admitted and what rejected,
at what times, and under what restrictions, must, in case of dispute, be
decided in the first instance by their own provincial judicature, subject to
revision and control of the king in council ' '4 .
This comment is only concerned with the rights of the settlers. The
reason for this is that, so far as the established states of the time were con-
cerned, newly-discovered territories were considered uninhabited, regardless
of the size of the aboriginal population, and therefore there was no existing
legal system which could conflict with that known to the settlers and which
they took with them. In those cases where there was already an established
state which had been conquered or ceded, the newcomers recognised that
the already-existing law prevailed until such time as it was amended by the
new sovereign. This was a matter of necessity and convenience, for if the
existing law were abrogated immediately anarchy would probably ensue.
At the same time, it was recognized that the local population would not be
any more familiar with the new law being introduced than the conquerors
would be with the already existing one. Sometimes this meant that the two
systems could, for a time at least, continue to survive side by side, operating
independently with each controlling its own community. This is, for example,
8 See, e.g., L.C. Green, Native Law and the Common Law: Conflict or Harmony
(1970), 12 Malaya L. Rev. 38.
4 1 Blackstone, Commentaries on the Laws of England 108.
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what happened in the case of the North American Indians in the United
States, but not in Canada. As Chief Justice Marshall pointed out6 :
America, separated from Europe by a wide ocean, was inhabited by a distinct
people, divided into separate nations, independent of each other and of the rest
of the world, having institutions of their own, and governing themselves by their
own laws.
The importance of this fact became clear some fifty years later, when the
Supreme Court held6 that an Indian who had murdered another Indian on a
reservation was not amenable to federal criminal law, but only to tribal law.
This situation, however, was terminated by statute two years later.7
In some instances attempts have been made not merely for the two sys-
tems to exist side by side independently, but for them to work cooperatively,
although this may produce the most incongruous results. This is illustrated
by the trial of a 'crocodile man' in Nyasaland in 1962.8 Elland brought an
action before a Native authority court seeking payment from one Odrick
who had contracted to pay him £4.10s. if he killed a girl suspected of
witchcraft. Elland, assuming the guise of a crocodile, carried out his part of
the arrangement, but only received 10s. from Odrick, whom he therefore sued
for non-payment of debt. The court ordered Odrick to pay £.2.10s. into
court in settlement and issued a receipt. Subsequently, both men were indicted
before the Nyasaland criminal court for murder.
This clash between the two systems often becomes evident when an
issue affecting the public policy of the ruler is involved. Thus, when England
settled abroad the general tendency was not to interfere with local customs
unless these were repugnant to English concepts of morality and ordre public.
Perhaps the most important instances of England's refusal to recognize local
ways are the rejection of suttee in India, even though this was a country
which the settlers recognized as having its own legal system at least in so
far as the personal rights of the Native inhabitants were concerned, and the
refusal to recognize the validity of polygamous marriages, even though they
might be acceptable locally. But on occasion the concept of public policy
was carried to much greater extremes, particularly when the judge was a
member of a colonial legal service whose natural tendency was to look to
the concepts of his own system and proved unwilling to accept anything
completely alien thereto. This happened in Tanganyika when Wilson, J.
held9 that
a Tura custom whereby the property of a father might be seized in compe~nsa-
tion for a wrong done by his son was so repugnant to British ideas of justice
and morality that it would not be endorsed in the High Court. It would, how-
ever, almost certainly have succeeded in a local court, to which such ideas of
vicarious liability would not be so difficult to accept.
5 Worcester v. Georgia (1832), 6 Pet. 515 at 542.
6 Ex parte Crow Dog (1883), 109 U.S. 556.
7 (1885), 23 Stat. 385; see now 18 U.S.C. s. 1153.
8 The Times (London), 25 August 1962.
9 Gwao bin Kelimo v. Kisunda bin Ifuti (1938), 1 T.L.R. (R.) 403; J.S.R. Cole
and W.N. Denison, Tanganyika, The Development of its Laws and Constitution (Lon-
don: Stevens, 1964) at 131.
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A somewhat similar approach is to be found in Nigerian judicial prac-
tice, even in the field of customary family law. Thus,
in Joshua Chawere v. Hannah Aihenuo it was held that any native custom to
the effect that a wife who committed adultery ... became the wife of the male
adulterer would be repugnant and unenforceable. And in this same field, the
English common law concept of "public policy", which would forbid the en-
couragement of promiscuous intercourse"', has been suggested' 2 as capable of
striking down the now well-established'S customary rule that an originally
illegitimate child whose paternity is acknowledged and recognized by its father
thereby acquires the same status as a child born legitimate.14
This peculiar attitude to 'public policy' has also been described as a
rejection of barbarism, although the Judicial Committee of the Privy Council
has recognized that 'barbarous' habits may become modified by the impact
of 'civilization'":
. . . the more barbarous customs of earlier days may under the influences of
civilization become milder without losing their essential character of custom...
so as in that form to regulate the relations of the native community inter sa
In other words, the court cannot itself transform a barbarous custom into a
milder one. If it still stands in its barbarous character, it must be rejected as
repugnant to "natural justice, equity and good conscience." It is the assent of
the native community that gives a custom its validity, and, therefore, barbarous
or mild, it must be shown to be recognized by the native community whose
conduct it is supposed to regulate.
The importance of the modifying character of the last two sentences is to
be seen in a judgment by the Chief Justice of Gambia which makes clear that
even a custom which might be rejected by Christian missionaries and would
certainly not be tolerated in Europe is not necessarily contrary to 'natural
justice'. He held in Koykoy Jatta v. Menna Camara'6 that female circumci-
sion "is your custom but can only be your custom in your own tribe and
applied to your own people".
When dealing with custom and its creation judges, particularly in English
colonial jurisdictions, are likely to apply their own backgrounds rather than
have regard for local realities. Thus, the Chief Justice of the Gold Coast
held' 7 that "according to the principles of English jurisprudence" a local
custom must date back to 1189, which is the date at which 'time immemorial'
begins at common law, but this view was rejected forty years later' 8 . It never
10 (1935), 12 Nigeria L. R. 4 (Div. Ct.).
11 See 'The Ladies' Directory Case', Shaw v. D.P.P., [1962] A.C. 220 (H.L.).
12 In re Sarah Adadevoh (1951), 13 W.A.C.A. 304 (W. African C.A., Nigeria) at
310 (per Verity, CJ.).
18 Savage v. Macfay, [1909] Ren. 504; Re Sapara, [1911] Ren. 605.
14 F. Ajayi, The Interaction of English Law with Customary Law in Western
Nigeria, 11 (1960), 4 J. African Law 98 at 104-05.
15 Eshugbayi Eleko v. Government of Nigeria (Officer Administering), [1931] A.C.
662 (P.C.) at 673 (per Lord Atkin).
10 (1964), 8 Journal of African Law 35.
17 Welbeck v. Brown, [1882] Sar. F.C.L. 185.
18 Mensah v. Wiaboe (1925), Div. Ct. Judgments 1921-5, 172; cf. T.O. Elias,
Ghana and Sierra Leone, The Development of their Laws and Constitutions (London:
Stevens, 1963) at 119.
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applied in Singapore, for "the history of Singapore began in 1819, more than
600 years after 1189, and that in itself concludes the matter"'19. This prob-
lem at least has been avoided in New Guinea, for there custom is regulated
by statute, permitting judicial declaration and recognition of recent and
altered custom, and since in this case native custom means local custom, it
may vary from place to place.2 0
On occasion, a courageous judge has been prepared to disregard the
general law and apply local custom. Perhaps the best known practitioner
in this field was Sissons, J. in the North West Territories when dealing with
the Inut,21 although it may well be argued that he was doing nothing but
applying the approach of his predecessor Witman, J. when determining
whether a marriage between Indians in the Territories, contracted in a form
which would have been valid before the introduction of English Law in
1870, was to be recognized. In 1885 the latter asked22:
[A~re the laws of England respecting the solemnization of marriage applicable
to these Territories quoad the Indian population? I have great doubt if these
laws are applicable to the Territories in any respect. According to these laws
marriages can be solemnized only at certain times and in certain places or
buildings. These times would be in many cases most inconvenient here and the
buildings, if they exist at all, are often so remote from the contracting parties
that they could not be reached save with the greatest inconvenience. I am
satisfied however that these laws are not applicable to the Territories quoad the
Indians. The Indians are for the most part unchristianed, 23 they yet adhere to
their own peculiar marriage customs and usages. It would be monstrous to hold
that the law of England respecting the solemnization of marriage is applicable
to them.... [A] marriage between Indians by mutual consent and according to
Indian custom since 15th July 1870, is a valid marriage, providing that neither
of the parties had a husband or wife, as the case might be, living at the time...
Witman, J. could have reached the same conclusion by holding that a com-
mon law marriage had been created by repute, but he preferred to apply the
native law, while insisting on monogamy. Some thirty years later a United
States court also recognized an Indian customary marriage, although
polygamous24.
In the case before Sissons, J. the issue was not directly that of the
validity of a marriage. Re Noah Estate25 turned on the application of the
Northwest Territories Intestate Succession Ordinance which depended on
whether the claimants were in fact the 'widow' and 'issue' of the deceased.
To decide this the Inuit marriage in question had to be examined to see
19Anguillia v. Ong Boon Tat (1921), 15 S.S.L.R. 190 at 193.
2
D Native Customs (Recognition) Ordinance 1963, s. 4.
2 1 J.H. Sissons, Judge of the Far North (Toronto: McClelland & Stewart, 1968).
22 Reg. v. Nan-E-Quis-A-Ka (1889), 1 Terr. L. R. 211 (N.W.T. Sup. Ct.) at 215.
23 It is perhaps worth mentioning that Mrs. Adesanya, the defendant mentioned
in n. 1, was formerly a Muslim who had become a Christian.
24 Kobogum v. Jackson Iron Co. (1889), 43 N.W. 602 (Mich. S. Ct.).
25 (1962), 32 D.L.R. (2d) 185 (N.W.T. Terr. Ct.) at 197-99, 202-03, 205-06 (It
was in connection with this case that Sissons, J. is alleged to have said: "I am not
going to have a lot of bastards in Ottawa tell me that my people here are a lot of
bastards.").
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whether it satisfied the conditions of a 'Christian' marriage as required by
English law. The suggestion that Eskimo cohabitation and marriage in ac-
cordance with Inuit custom was mere concubinage was dismissed by the
judge as 'fanciful and scandalous', since "marriage according to Eskimo
custom is not 'the Eskimo custom of concubinage'." He considered that the
Inuit system of trial marriage was as separate from marriage proper as is the
Western system of 'engagement' or 'going steady'. He pointed out that the
relationship in question complied
in every respect with the requirements of what was known, according to the
old law of England, as a consensual marriage, that is formed or existing by
mere consent. The old law of England recognized a consensual marriage. The
general law of Europe apparently also recognized a consensual marriage as being
in all respects perfect . . . . The Marriage Ordinance ... has no provision stating
that a native marriage is invalid and no statement that a marriage carried but
on the basis of common law is null and void.... This Ordinance is misnamed.
In spite of its title, this is not a Marriage Ordinance but a Solemnization of
Marriage Ordinance .... I think there was considerable solemnization of this
marriage, even if tinged with irregularity.
The solemnization of an Eskimo marriage follows pretty well that of the
Anglican Church, or rather the Anglican Church's solemnization seems to fol-
low that of the Eskimos. In Christian countries marriage did not become a
religious ceremony before the 9th century, when newly-wed couples began coming
to the church door to have their union blessed by the priest. The marriage had
already taken place and was generally a family and community affair...
as was the case with the instant marriage, where everybody knew of the
union and accepted it.
The marriage custom of the Society of Friends (Quakers) seems very much like
that of the Eskimos. The Friends marry at a special meeting called for the
occasion, the only formality being a public declaration of the marriage by the
couple and the signing of a certificate by all present as witnesses .... [As for
the Interstate Succession Ordinance, tihis Ordinance does not apply to Indians.
The Indian Act . . . has its own provisions for intestate succession . . . . The
rights and customs of the Indians have not been completely ignored. They have
their treaties and their Indian Act, codifying some at least of their rights and
customs. The Eskimos have no treaty. They have not given the covenant appear-
ing in the Indian treaties, whereby: "They promise and engage that they will,
in all respects, obey and abide by the law." They have no Eskimo Act....
[T]hey have no one to represent them in Parliament. They have no representation
on the Territories Council of the Northwest Territories. This Court must guard
their rights, when it can, and sometimes must write upon a clean slate.
While I think that generally the Intestate Succession Ordinance has no ap-
plication to Eskimos, I think there are times and circumstances when these
provisions are applicable to an Eskimo estate . . .
and among such circumstances was the instant case where the deceased had
gone to live in white society and had become part of that society and
economy.
As an instance of a situation in which colonial judges thought they
were applying native customs of marriage and concubinage one might cite
the Six Widows casePO in Singapore. Here, English judges introduced into
Singapore a concept of Chinese law not previously known and still not
20 (1888), 12 S.S.L.R. 120 at 187, 209.
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recognized in China27. The case concerned the status of Chinese 'concubines',
and Hyndman Jones, C. J. accepted that
the evidence is very contradictory, but I am disposed to think that when it is
intended to take a woman into a man's household as a concubine for the pur-
pose of securing a succession, or at all events as more than a temporary mistress,
there is some sort of ceremonies; although these ceremonies, in some districts
and among some classes are of a more or less perfunctory character, and always
much less elaborate than those adopted in the case of a t'sai [principal wife].
Braddell, J., whose knowledge of Chinese law was no better than that of the
Chief Justice, declared
I entirely adopt the exposition of the Chinese law given in the judgment of the
Chief Justice and concur with him in the conclusion to which he has arrived,
namely, that concubinage is recognized as a legal institution under the law,
conferring upon the tsip [secondary wife] a legal status of a permanent character.
Half way through the twentieth century, judges were still anxious to
uphold domestic arrangements of Singapore citizens if they possibly could.
This is clear from the attitude of the Privy Council in upholding a local
decision recognizing as a marriage a ceremony conducted by a Chinese be-
tween a Chinese Christian woman and a Jewish man in a house before
witnesses, with each party offering prayers in his own way2s:
[While] it is not suggested that either party to the marriage in question was a
Christian [,] . . . the evidence as it stands sufficiently proves a common law
monogamous marriage. The wishes expressed by the respondent and her mother
for a Church marriage, the reason why a modified Chinese ceremony was
substituted, . . . the words spoken by the Chinese gentleman who performed
the ceremony as to a life-long union, the cohabitation as man and wife which
followed and continued until the husband's death, and the introduction by the
deceased to a Christian pastor of the respondent as his wife, and last, but not
least, the baptism of their children as Christians with the approval of their
father, all indicate that the spouses intended to contract a common law
monogamous marriage.
Although it may be true that the parties did intend to effect a lifelong mar-
riage which was rendered respectable by the introduction of the common
law to modify the rigours of the local law, a similar result might have been
obtained if the court had adopted the words of Lord Phillimore in an earlier
case involving Chinese parties29:
In deciding upon a case where the customs and the laws are so different from
British ideas a Court may do well to recollect that it is a possible jural con-
ception that a child may be legitimate, though its parents were not and could
not be legitimately married.
The need to recognize potentially strange jural conceptions because of
basic deviations from the British way of life is to be seen in the memoirs of
Austin Coates, a former Special Magistrate in Hong Kong who never qualified
legally and perhaps, therefore, found it comparatively simple to apply rough
2 7 Information imparted to the writer by senior Chinese judges in Singapore and
Malaysia.
28 Penhas v. Tan Soo Eng, [1953] A.C. 304 (P.C.) (Singapore) at 318-20.
29 Khoo Hooi Leong v. Khoo Hean Kwee, [1926] A.C. 529 (P.C.) (Straits Settle-
ments) at 543.
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justice in accordance with local Chinese customs0 . In fact there may be
much to be said for appointing non-home trained personnel or non-lawyers
to deal with issues among 'primitive' peoples, for even though the 'case
may appear as a formal legal process, the person hearing it has often to act
as a 'Dutch uncle' or a mediator rather than as a judge. Such mediation is
likely to be far more successful if the officer is aware of or amenable to
native susceptibilities, reactions and habits. Such a case came before a native
'specialist' local court magistrate in Wewak, New Guinea in 196731. Joana
claimed that Anton had married her at Rabaul, having paid the required
bride-price. She contended that the custom of her people was 'one man one
wife', and although a child had been born she sought dissolution on the
ground that Anton had become interested in Agnes, whom he regarded as
his second wife, and had told Joana to return to Rabaul. Anton complained
of Joana's conduct towards him and his relatives, and pointed out that she
could not work because of the child, and so he had to get another wife, but
I have not paid Agnes's bride price yet. However, since she has been in my
village for one week, we claim it is a marriage by native custom. I believe her
parents would not dispute her marrying me.
The magistrate advised them that in his view
a valid marriage obtained between Joana and Anton by native custom, bride-
price having been paid; the 'marriage' between Agnes and Anton was not a
valid marriage according to native custom, no bride-price having been paid to
Agnes's parents and no celebrations held by way of recognition of marriage in
accordance with the local custom; Joana would be entitled to have her marriage
dissolved by native custom since in her community there should be only one
woman and one man in a marriage.
Joana thereupon agreed to withdraw her suit, provided Anton would send
Agnes away, and to this Anton agreed. We have here, therefore, an instance
of a magistrate preserving a marriage when, had there been a formal local
court hearing, he would almost certainly have found it necessary to issue
an order for dissolution in accordance with the Local Courts Ordinance,
1963, s. 17.
As long ago as 1919 Lord Sumner recognized the need to acknowledge
the existence of native institutions of law and the limitations inherent in
seeking to impose 'civilized' law upon 'primitive' peopl&2:
The estimation of the rights of aboriginal tribes is always inherently difficult.
Some tribes are so low in the scale of social organization that their usages and
conceptions of rights and duties are not to be reconciled with the institutions
or the legal ideas of civilized society. Such a gulf cannot be bridged. It would
be idle to impute to such people some shadow of the rights known to our law
and then to transmute it into the substance of [e.g.] transferable rights of
property as we know them .... On the other hand, there are indigenous peo-
ples whose legal conceptions, though differently developed are hardly less precise
than our own. When once they have been studied and understood they are no
less enforceable than rights arising under English law.
30A. Coates, Myself a Mandarin (London: Muller, 1968), esp. at 22-25, 204-12.
3l Joana-Vapor v. Anton Susami and Agnes-Daporobu (cf. BJ. Brown, ed., Fashion
of Law in New Guinea (Sydney: Butterworths, 1969) at 209).
32 1n re Southern Rhodesia, [1919] A.C. 211 (P.C.) at 233-34.
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Unfortunately, however, judges from the colonial powers or from among
settlers who have become the establishment are rarely prepared to study or
understand such local legal systems.
On the other hand, recent trends in the recognition by the law of
the significance of psychology have often resulted in local judges taking a
special - and often more lenient - view of the law when a 'primitive' is
involved. Evidence of this is to be found in as widely separate jurisdictions
as South Africa, Papua and New Guinea and Australia. In 1951 the Appel-
late Division of the South African Supreme Court heard the appeal of Mrs.
Mkizeus who had been found guilty of murder, having placed arsenic, which
she believed to be a love potion, in her husband's beer. In substituting a
finding of culpable homicide for the murder conviction, the Court stated:
The belief which the accused says she had in the results of administering the
potion ... may appear to educated minds to be absurd but it must be borne in
mind that the accused is an illiterate native woman living in a native kraal and
that it is well known that natives genuinely believe in magic and witchcraft.
The question of native beliefs was equally important in an earlier case in
which a murder verdict had been reduced to culpable homicide. Some Native
children thought they had seen a tikoloshe in a hut, and since it would be
fatal for humans to look such an evil spirit in the face they summoned the
accused, a Native youth of 18, to deal with it. Like them, he thought it was a
tikoloshe and struck it with a hatchet. When he dragged the tikoloshe from
the hut, he found that he had killed his nephew who had been sleeping there.
In the course of its judgment, the Appellate Division held34 that the standard
of reasonableness in such a case was "not that of an ordinary 18-year-old
Native living at home in his kraal, but that of a reasonable person of his age. 3
A somewhat more reasonable approach to the idea of legal reasonable-
ness has been adopted by judges dealing with Papuan Natives and Australian
aborigines. It is a well-established rule of 'civilized' law that words alone
are not sufficient to ground a defence based on provocation. Brennan, A. J.
of the Supreme Court of Papua and New Guinea had to decide whether
insulting words could provoke a killing 6. The words had been spoken by
a woman to a man who had himself used a coarse expression to the woman's
daughter: she said 'You cannot find a woman to marry, and if you talk
like that to a girl child you will die still unmarried.' The judge pointed
out that in
western communities which apply common law principles, the view that words
alone cannot be relied upon as a provocation has hardened since the seventeenth
century. As a general proposition that thesis is hardly open to dispute, but it
does not necessarily follow that the same principle should apply in a native
33 R. v. Mkize, [1951] 3 S. Afr. L. R. 28 (App. Div.) at 33 (per Centlivres, C.J.).
34 R. v. Mbombela, [1933] S. Afr. L. R. (App. Div.) at 271 (per de Villiers, J.A.).
35 For consideration of the concept of the 'reasonable man' in relation to the armed
forces, see L.C. Green, Superior Orders and the Reasonable Man (1970), 8 Can. Y. B.
Int. Law 61.
36 R. v. Awaba (1960) unreported (cf. Hookey, The "Clapham Omnibus" in New
Guinea, in Brown, op. cit., fn. 31, 117 at 126).
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community where sophisticatibn does not approach to that of, say, seventeenth-
century England, where a type of insult such as the one here in question is
calculated and not infrequently intended to throw a man into an ungovernable
rage.
This seems to be a not unusual attitude for judges in that part of the world
to adopt and in R. v. Zariai-Gavene37 the judge expressly took into con-
sideration the effect of the words spoken upon a Goilala villager, of whom
the accused was one. Equally aware of the realities in that jurisdiction was
the comment of Smithers, J.38 that "for the exemplification of the ordinary
man [in the Territory] one must take the ordinary native living the rural
life of low standard led by the accused and his relatives and similar lines....
The man in the lap lap takes the place of the man on the Clapham omnibus."
Perhaps one of the most enlightened judgments in this field is that
of Bright, J. of South Australia in R. v. Gibson.39 The accused, an aborigine
living on the Yalata reserve, was charged with killing another aborigine,
and as soon as the case came for trial the judge was faced with a problem
that is more likely to affect 'primitive' rather than 'civilized' defendants. It
was argued on behalf of the defendant that the case concerned 'men's secrets'
and therefore no woman should be allowed on the jury or in the courtroom,
for if any were present witnesses would refuse to give evidence and the
defendant would be denied the opportunity of a fair trial. This request was
acceded to by the learned judge, and one cannot help but wonder what
might have happened in a similar case in Canada affecting an Indian or an
Inuit in view of the Bill of Rights and the ban on discrimination against
women - although it must be remembered that a Canadian judge has the
right to order a hearing in camera if he considers that justice so demands.
The killing arose out of a quarrel occasioned by insulting remarks concern-
ing aboriginal circumcision at a time when both the deceased and the accused
were somewhat the worse for liquor. During his judgment, Bright, J. soon
made it clear that he was aware of the peculiar problems confronting him
because aborigines were involved, for one of the preliminary issues related
to the accused's statement to the police. It was pleaded that Natives tended
to say what they thought the authorities wished them to say, and while the
judge agreed
•.. that there is a distinction to be made between white persons who have been
brought up in the concepts of society and ideas (including the idea of inde-
pendence of authority) prevalent in Europe and Australia on the one hand, and
indigenous persons who not only have a limited command of English but whose
whole culture differs radically from the white culture [, . . . and] if the accused
had been able to express his state of mind he might have said,
"Yes, I know that you have told me that I don't have to answer, but I
am an uneducated black man from my tribe and you are white men in
authority over me and I am frightened of you; so when you ask me a ques-
tion I answer you because I can't exercise my right to keep silent when
people like you ask me questions."
37 [1963] P. & N.G.L.R. 203.
88R. v. Rumints-Gorok, [1963] P. & N.G.L.R. 81 at 83.
8a Judgment No. 1810, delivered 12 November 1973. The writer is indebted to
Bright, J. for having supplied him with a transcript of the judgment (italics added).
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[But i]f I were to exclude the statement on that ground I should be creating a
different law for Aborigines from the law applicable to white men. And I should
be overlooking the fact that many white accused persons who are cautioned are
ignorant, simple minded and scared ....
In the course of his address to the jury, Bright, J. constantly indicated
his awareness that the accused was an Aborigine:
The accused, like the deceased, is a member of the Pitjantjajara tribe living in a
tribal environment. From the foundation of the Province of South Australia
black people and white people have lived under the same laws of the country.
The tribesman is more immediately aware of the laws of the tribe which pre-
serve his culture and ensure his survival in the arid conditions of outback
Australia. In the same way a nun in a convent may be more aware of the laws
of the convent. I must hasten to add that I should regard a nun as being much
less remote from the general white culture than a Pitjantjajara tribesman. Per-
haps it is unnecessary for me to add that I am in no way talking of relative
intelligence. Indeed, I do not know what is the measure of intelligence. If it
be an ability to survive and to thrive in the environment in which one finds
oneself, and I would think that this is the proper test, then the Pitjantjajara
Aboriginal displays an ability to do both, according to his own lights, in his
own environment. I am not prepared to say that white persons in general,
display a greater ability to thrive according to white concepts in a white en-
vironment than black persons, in general, do according to black concepts in
theirs. In each case one must apply not absolute standards but standards of
achievement capable of attainment in the particular environment.
.. . What the rules of a convent or a tribe may do by way of retribution to a
member who broke the criminal law is no concern of ours at present. . . . [A]
nun might be shocked more readily and more deeply than many members of the
general public by a blaspheming of the Christian faith. And a tribesman would
be more shocked, disturbed and aroused by an improper disclosure of the sacred
mysteries of tribal lore than you or I would be. The law is not foolish. It takes
account of these matters.
. . . We shall often have more difficulty in understanding black men's ways than
white men's ways for we are ignorant in these matters....
Your task is to determine whether it is reasonably possible that a tribal
Aboriginal who took a reasonable view of the matter - if you like, a reasonable
tribal Aboriginal - might have been so provoked by the things that the deceased
said and did, that when he struck ... the deceased he was so carried away that
he was not the master of his mind but had lost control of himself, that at the
most he is guilty of manslaughter....
. . . It is true that the blows were heavy, but we are not dealing with dainty
members of society. We are considering tribal Aborigines living in the desert ...
* . . [Me had been provoked by violence himself and by the insulting and
terrifying use of ritual references. These ritual references, if he heard them
without protest might expose him to punishment, and punishment in the tribe
might go as far as death.
... Not every form of provocation is of effect in the criminal law. The provoca-
tion is usually said to be such as would cause a reasonable man to lose control
of himself. Where tribal lore in a tribal setting is improperly referred to by an
initiated tribesman to an uninitiated tribesman it is useless to think of a rea-
sonable white man. One must think of a reasonable man having the awareness,
the timidity, the ordinary reactions of a Pitfantiajara tribesman, viewing the
tribe as a social group and the accused as a member of the group ....
In fine, the jury found the accused not guilty of murder or manslaughter.
Even when courts in 'civilized' countries have had to deal with 'primitive'
people, not aboriginals or other indigenous groups, but alien persons coming
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from less sophisticated cultures, they have in recent years adopted a more
reasonable attitude than was formerly the case. Marriage is probably as
good an example as any to take. The general rule of the common law is
that marriage as understood by Christendom is monogamous and Hyde v.
Hyde4o has been generally accepted as establishing that rule, although in
Canada this seems not to have been the case, at least in so far as Indian
marriages were concerned, for as was pointed out by Monk, J. in Jones v.
Fraser
4'
It has been said that polygamy existed among the Indian tribes of the North-
West, and that the marriage invoked by the respondent could not therefore be
supposed to possess the character required for marriage in all christian coun-
tries, that is unity and perpetuity .... [Plolygamy did not exist, as a rule, among
those who married Indian women, but only among the Indian tribes. A marriage
which took place there according to the local usage was considered as an
ordinary marriage.
Today, even jurisdictions which applied Hyde rigorously have moved away
from so narrow an approach. An example is Ochochuku v. Ochochuku4.
The parties, though Christians, had entered into a marriage in accordance
with Native custom in 1949 in Nigeria, at which time Nigeria permitted
polygamy. While in England they went through a register office marriage
and subsequently the wife sued for divorce, which was granted. However,
[W]hatever might be the effect on the marriage for other purposes and in other
courts of the parties being Christians, in this Court and for this purpose the
Nigerian marriage must be regarded as a polygamous marriage over which this
court does not exercise jurisdiction.
I therefore pronounce a decree nisi for the dissolution not of the Nigerian
marriage but of the marriage in London. I am told that, in fact, that win be
effective by Nigerian law to dissolve the Nigerian marriage; but that forms no
part of my judgment. That is for someone else to determine and not for me.
By 1968, in M. v. K.43, the English courts were adopting a far more
liberal attitude to what were potentially polygamous marriages. Justices
had committed a fourteen-year-old Nigerian girl to the care of a local author-
ity as being exposed to moral danger. Some five months earlier she had gone
through a potentially polygamous marriage with a Nigerian male of 25 in
Nigeria where they were both domiciled. The magistrates in making the
order for care, protection and control held, wrongly, that since the marriage
was potentially polygamous it could not be recognized in England. The
Queen's Bench Divisional Court held, however, that in so far as the gir1's
40 (1866), L.R. 1 P. & D. 130.
41 (1886), 12 Q.L.R. 327 (S.Ct.) at 335. See also his decision in Connolly v.
Woolrich (1867), 11 Lower Can. Jur. 197 (Sup.Ct.), and G.W. Bartholomew, Recogni-
tions of Polygamous Marriages in Canada (1961), 10 Int. & Comp. Law Q. 305. See,
also, Kaur v. Ginder (1958), 13 D.L.R. (2d) 465 (B.C. S.Ct.) in which the court
upheld a valid polygamous marriage in India by an East Indian domiciled in B.C. to
an Indian woman domiciled in India, as barring a subsequent monogamous marriage.
42 [1960] 1 W.L.R. 183 (P.D.A.) at 185 (per Wrangham, J.). See, also, T.C.
Hartley, Polygamy and Social Policy (1969), 32 Modern Law Rev. 155.
43 The Times (London), 29 March 1968; reported as Mohamed v. Knott, [1968]
2 W.L.R. 1446 (Q.B.) at 1456 (italics added).
[VOL. 13, NO. I
Civilized Law
status was concerned, the marriage would be recognized and she would be
a wife. Lord Parker, C. J. pointed out:
... the question was whether the evidence justified such an order [of protection].
The justices had found that before the marriage the [man] had lived with a
woman and had had three illegitimate children, and that after the marriage, at a
time when the wife had almost certainly not reached puberty, he had had inter-
course with her. After the marriage he had contracted gonorrhoea from a
prostitute, but he was now cured and intended to resume intercourse with hig
wife. The justices had found that the continuance of the association between the
girl and the appellant would be repugnant to any decent minded English person.
. . . They had misdirected themselves and were considering the reactions of an
Englishman regarding an English man and woman in the western way of life.
A decent Englishman realising the way in which a Nigerian man and woman
were brought up would not say it was repugnant. They developed sooner and
there was nothing abhorrent in a girl of 13 marrying a man of 25. To say the
girl was in moral danger would be ignoring the way of life in which she and her
husband had been brought up. It had been suggested that every time that the
appellant slept with his wife in England, he was committing a criminal offence
under the Sexual Offences Act, 1956, s. 6 which made it an offence for a man
to have unlawful intercourse with a girl between 13 and 16 . . . . [The Lord
Chief Justice did] not think the police could properly prosecute cases where a
foreign marriage was recognized in England. . . . Intercourse between a man
and wife was lawful .. . Where a husband and wife were recognized as validly
married according to the laws of England, His Lordship would not say the wife
was exposed to moral danger because she carried out her wifely duties.
Within the last ten years or so a new issue as between 'civilized' law
and 'primitive' people has arisen in some countries possessing indigenous
populations. This concerns the meaning of the relationship established be-
tween the original inhabitants and the invaders on the basis of treaties drawn
up between them. This is not the place to discuss whether these documents
are 'treaties' in the technical sense of that term or what their exact legal
significance and import may be44. What is important, however, is that these
documents were drafted by sophisticated lawyers operating within their own
legal milieu and that the terms they used were the technical terms known
to them and probably impossible of translation into the language of the
aboriginals with whom they were negotiating. This is largely true whether
the invaders were government spokesmen or the representatives of such
trading companies as the British and Dutch East India Companies or the
Hudson Bay Company, or whether the Natives with whom they were dealing
were North American Indians, Malay or east Indian princes, Australian
Aborigines, Javanese or Sumatrans, or New Zealand Maoris. In none of
these cases could it be said that the parties were operating on a basis of
true equality and it is doubtful whether the Native negotiators were at any
time really ad idem with the westerners. Problems therefore arise with regard
to the interpretation of these documents which were held out to be legally
binding arrangements and requiring legal interpretation. Recognition of this
44 See L.C. Green, Legal Significance of Treaties Affecting Canadads Indians (1972),
1 Anglo-American L. Rev. 119.
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fact is to be found in the judgment of the United States Supreme Court at
the end of the nineteenth century, when Justice Gray commented 45 :
In construing any treaty between the United States and an Indian tribe, it must
always . . . be borne in mind that the negotiations for the treaty are conducted,
on the part of the United States, an enlightened and powerful nation, by repre-
sentatives skilled in diplomacy, masters of a written language, understanding
the modes and forms of creating the various estates known to their law, and
assisted by an interpreter employed by themselves; that the treaty is drawn up
by them and in their own language; that the Indians, on the other hand, are a
weak and dependent people, who have no written language and are unfamiliar
with all the forms of legal expression, and whose only knowledge of the terms
in which the treaty is framed is that imparted to them by the interpreter em-
ployed by the United States; and that the treaty must therefore be construed,
not according to the technical meaning of the words to learned lawyers, but
in the sense in which they would naturally be understood by the Indians.
When looking at the treaties made with the Canadian Indians it is
equally necessary to bear this comment in mind, particularly in the light of
the historical background of the treaties. Thus, in a despatch relating to
the North-West Angle Treaty negotiations, 1873, Lieutenant-Governor Morris
reported4" that
The principal [Indian] spokesman, Mawedopenais, came forward and drew off
his gloves, and spoke as follows: "Now you see me stand before you all. What
has been done here today, has been done openly before the Great Spirit, and
before the nation, and I hope that I may never hear any one say that this treaty
has been done secretly. And now, in closing this council, I take off my glove,
and in giving you my hand, I deliver over my birthright, and lands, and in
taking your hand I hold fast all the promises you have made, and I hope they
will last as long as the sun goes round, and the water flows, as you have said."
To which I replied as follows: "I accept your hand, and with it the lands, and
will keep all my promises, in the firm belief that the treaty now to be signed
will bind the red man and the white man together as friends forever".
The Manitoban, in reporting the meeting, stated 47 that Morris also told the
Indians:
... you ought to see by what the Queen is offering you that she loves her red
subjects as much as her white .... [T]hat what I offer you is to be while the
water flows and the sun rises. You know that in the United States they only pay
the Indians for twenty years .... I only ask you to think for yourselves, and
for your families, and for your children and children's children...
Again, when negotiating with the Cree at Forts Carlton and Pitt s,
Morris gave assurances:
I told you that what I was promising was not for today or tomorrow only, but
should continue as long as the sun shone and the river flowed. My words will
pass away and so will yours, so I always write down what I promise, that our
children may know what we said and did. Next year I will send copies of what
45 Jones v. Meehan (1899), 175 U.S. 1 at 10-11.
4
0 A. Morris, The Treaties of Canada with the Indians (Toronto: Belfords, Clarke,
1880) at 51.
47 18 Oct. 1873 (cf. Morris, op.cit fn. 46 at 61).
4 8 Morris, op.cit. fn. 46 at 208, 213.
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is written in the treaty, printed on skin, so that it cannot run out or be destroyed,
and one shall be given to each Chief so that there may be no mistakes.
This was also the understanding of the Indians as is shown by the comment
of Chief Mis-tah-wah-sis:
What we speak of and do now will last as long as the sun shines and the river
runs, we are looking forward to our children's children, for we are old and we
have but few days to live.
Apparently not all the agreements were made in this way, at least in
the case of British Columbia:
The practice was to pay the Indians the purchase price against their signature by
mark on blank paper to be filled in later as a deed. In 1854 the Saalequun tribe
so surrendered their lands on Commercial Inlet, 12 miles up the Nanaimo River.
For that surrender no deed was made up but the signatures or marks were ob-
tained on blank paper against payment.49
Recognizing the disproportionate relationship between the parties and
the peculiarities of language used, as well as the need to uphold the dignity
of the Crown in whose name these arrangements were made, Canadian
judges have, for the main part, accepted the need for an uberrima fida
interpretation of the rights of the Indians under these treaties. Thus, when
holding that the Alberta Game Act did not interfere with the right to hunt
embodied in the relevant treaty, McGillavray, J. A. held5" that the latter
must be interpreted:
with the exactness which honour and good conscience dictate ...
It is satisfactory to be able to come to this conclusion and not to have to decide
that "the Queen's promises" have not been fulfilled. It is satisfactory to think
that the legislators have not so enacted but that the Indians may still be "con-
vinced of our justice and determined resolution to remove all reasonable cause
of discontent"
as stipulated in the Royal Proclamation of 1763 guaranteeing their rights
against encroachment.
A somewhat similar approach is to be found in a judgment of Patterson,
Co. Ct. J.51:
Having called the agreement a treaty, and having perhaps lulled the Indians
into believing it to be a treaty with all the sacredness of a treaty attached to it,
it may be the Crown should not now be heard to say it is not a treaty ... That
is a matter of representations to the proper authorities - representations which
... could hardly fail to be successful.
This view, however, may be regarded as somewhat sanguine, for in 1964
when construing Morris's promises and their interminability, McGillavray,
J. A. said that at the time of drafting the legislation being interpreted, and
which was alleged to be inconsistent with treaty promises, it appeared "likely
that these obligations under the treaties were overlooked"5,2 .
49 R. v. White and Bob (1965), 50 DJ.L.R (2d) 613 (B.C.C.A.) at 622 (per
Sheppard, J.A.).
50 R. v. Wesley, [1932] 2 W.W.R. 337 (Alta. C.A.) at 351-53.
51 R. v. Syliboy, [1929] 1 D.L.R. 307 (N.S.Co.Ct.) at 314.
52 R. v. Sikyea (1964), 46 W.W.R. 65 (N.W.T.C.A.) at 74.
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There can be little doubt that the legislative body of any of the countries
alleged to be bound by such treaties is competent to pass legislation abro
gating, controverting or disregarding these alleged undertakings. However, it
should be borne in mind that equity and morality demand a modicum of
good faith even, or perhaps especially, in the relations between 'civilized'
and 'primitive' peoples. Moreover, the political framework of the present era
suggests that one can no longer ride roughshod over the rights of people
and that aborigines have their rights as well as others, and that there are
plenty of bodies, some truly altruistic and others perhaps with an ideological
axe to grind, who will publicize what they consider to be disregard or abuse
of such rights. However, there is a limit to the extent to which modem and
newly discovered or invented rights can be used in order to interpret docm-
ments and undertakings that were entered into before such concepts were
even dreamed of. This is true of, for example, aboriginal rights in the sense
of continued ownership or independence and self-determination 3.
It is perhaps inevitable that difficulties and controversies arise when a
'civilized' system of law attempts to deal with the problems, rights and status
of 'primitive' peoples, and it may well be that complete elimination of such
confrontation is beyond human reach. However, it may be possible to reduce
the contretemps and effect a more congenial modus vivendi. In so far as
arrangements like treaties are concerned, an attempt should be made on both
the political and judicial level to recognize the extent to which the 'primitives'
were misled into certain beliefs and the 'civilized' took advantage of those
beliefs. So far as possible the arrangements should be interpreted in the
sense in which the 'primitives' were led to understand them and, in ac-
cordance with the principle of normal interpretation, contra proferentem the
party responsible for putting forward the particular terms or holding out
particular promises. When a legislature wishes to abandon its undertakings
towards the 'primitives' and effect a state of affairs which appears to be
contrary to the anticipations of those 'primitives', care should be taken to
ensure that these people are not given the impression that their rights are
being disregarded under the guise of 'civilized' legality. Effort should be
exercised to ensure that the reason for change is fully explained, some
quid pro quo extended, and the participation of the representatives of the
'primitives' arranged for.
In so far as the situation relates to the judicial application of 'civilized'
law, it is perhaps time that we start teaching the magistrates who will be
called upon to judge such cases some of the folk lore and folkways of the
people concerned. It might also be wise to encourage the use of mediators)
rather than judges. Perhaps, best of all would be to encourage members of
the 'primitive? community to make themselves acquainted with the require-
ments of the 'civilized' system of law and enable them to qualify for judicial
53 See, e.g., L.C. Green, Canada's Indians and Trusteeship (1975), 4 Anglo-
American Law Review.
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office or appointment as mediators, recognizing that they will be called upon
to temper this 'black letter' law with an equitable understanding of native
needs. There is not really any reason why even a sophisticated society should
not be willing to recognize the special needs of a particular group, in much
the same way as customs of a particular trade are recognized and accepted.
It is all very well to say that the law must be obeyed and its grandeur upheld.
To do this, however, sometimes entails injustice and denial of the rule of
law. Writing in 1851, John Ruskin said54:
All things are literally better, lovelier, and more beloved for the imperfections
which have been divinely appointed, that the law of human life may be Effort,
and the law of human judgment, Mercy.
54 The Stones of Venice, vol. 2, ch. 6, s. 25.

